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This study examines whether firms can influence their cost of equity (COE) by broadly
disseminating their carbon information over Twitter. We study firms' dissemination
decisions of carbon information bydeveloping a comprehensivemeasure of carbon infor-
mation that a firmmakes onTwitter, referred to as iCarbon. Using a sample of 1,737 firm‐
year observations for 584 nonfinancial firmswith aTwitter account and listed on theU.S.
NASDAQ stock exchange over the period 2009–2015, we find that iCarbon is signifi-
cantly and negatively associated with COE. Our results are consistent after determining
the effect of Bloomberg's environmental and environmental, social, and governance dis-
closure. The findings also hold when using alternative measures of COE and iCarbon.
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Undoubtedly, climate change‐related events that receive high media
coverage and increased attention from environmental groups, govern-
ments, and investors motivate firms to make strategic investments to
improve their environmental performance (El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kim,
& Park, 2018) and to consider carbon impacts as part of their manage-
ment strategy (Sprengel & Busch, 2011; Weinhofer & Hoffmann,
2010). Such interest has “created opportunities and challenges for firms
in their risk‐return relationships with shareholders and other stake-
holders” (Ng & Rezaee, 2015, p. 128). This interest also puts growing
pressure on managers to satisfy shareholders' carbon‐related informa-
tion demands to enable investors to assess potential risks, including reg-
ulatory, physical, and business risks, and evaluate their investment
strategy (e.g., Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2014). Managers, therefore, have
incentives to show their proactivity by strategically conveyingmessages
about carbon‐related information to reduce investors' uncertainty
about future cash flows and to sustain a better competitive advantage
and reputation (see Botosan, 1997; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). The
value of carbon information, however, is expected to increase as more
stakeholders become aware of it (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Although- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Creative Commons Attribution Li
entfirms may disclose carbon information, it is difficult to ensure that this
information reaches a larger set of investors by relying on traditional
or third‐party communication channels, which results in information
asymmetry (see Blankespoor, Miller, & White, 2014; Easley & O'hara,
2004) and thus a higher cost of equity (COE; e.g., Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang,
& Yang, 2011). Consequently, firms acknowledge the importance of
improving the dissemination of their information apart from disclosure
(Bushee, Core, Guay, & Hamm, 2010; Bushee & Miller, 2012). Thus, a
broader spread of carbon information allows potential investors to be
aware of a firm's information and enlarges the investor base, which in
turn can improve firm value and reduce the COE (Byun & Oh, 2018;
Heinkel, Kraus, & Zechner, 2001; Merton, 1987).
This study employs legitimacy theory to examine whether a firm's
dissemination of carbon‐related information (iCarbon) on Twitter's
social media network can influence a firm's COE. Social media is an
essential tool for connecting stakeholders with firms, for influencing
corporate practice, and for controlling corporate pollution and irre-
sponsible practices (Jia, Tong, Viswanath, & Zhang, 2016). The Twitter
platform, which enables the isolation of the effect of dissemination
from that of disclosure (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Jung, Naughton,
Tahoun, & Wang, 2018), has “changed the disclosure landscape and- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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1We focus on carbon information because U.S. firms that emit at least 25,000 metric tons of
CO2 are mandated to report their emissions, but not on Twitter, which allows us to differen-
tiate the effect of dissemination from that of disclosure decisions.
2The legitimacy concept is “rooted in neo‐institutional social theory…and has branched out
from sociology and is commonly used within legal scholarship that examines the connections
among legal frameworks, social norms and decision making” (Bowen, 2014, p. 59). Parsons
(1960) viewed legitimacy in organisational institutionalism as the sharing of common values
between the organisation and the social system in which it exists. Among other institutional
theorists, Suchman (1995) provided an in‐depth analysis of organisational legitimacy and
referred to it as “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values,
beliefs, and definitions” (p. 574).
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(Lee, Hutton, & Shu, 2015, p. 368) and can provide positive signals
to market participants about a firm's environmental responsibility to
respond to the uncertainty of carbon risks and to improve the firm's
reputation and image (Barnett & Salomon, 2012). Twitter's design of
short messages (tweets) may allow many firms to gain legitimacy
among stakeholders and avoid scrutiny by demonstrating that they
are environmentally responsible organisations (see Stanny, 2013).
Twitter also allows firms to know the size of their audience and the
number of their followers, which may motivate their decision to dis-
seminate to a broader audience, in a much more timely and efficient
manner than a corporate website can achieve. Firms can share their
news and discuss their performance through the use of a hashtag
(#CarbonEmissions or #ClimateChange) to spread their messages to
stakeholders who are concerned about global warming issues and
threats and to attract the attention of these stakeholders. By
retweeting, the recipients of carbon‐related tweets can share this
information with their followers to expand the information reach to
a more diverse audience and to more potential investors. In essence,
using Twitter allows firms to reach potential investors directly and
prolongedly in a timely manner that can reduce the time, effort, and
energy that investors need to spend on finding, searching for, and
accessing information (Blankespoor, 2018; Miller & Skinner, 2015).
Twitter also mitigates information asymmetry by meeting the demand
for information and ensuring its availability to investors (Blankespoor
et al., 2014; Hirshleifer, Lim, & Teoh, 2009; Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003).
Our paper makes several contributions to the extant literature.
First, although the extant research (e.g., Balvers, Du, & Zhao, 2017;
Chen & Gao, 2011; Gupta, 2018; Jung, Herbohn, & Clarkson, 2018;
Kim, An, & Kim, 2015; Lee, Park, & Klassen, 2015; Li, Liu, Tang, & Xiong,
2017; Peng, Sun,& Luo, 2015; Sharfman&Fernando, 2008; Zhou, Zhang,
Wen, Zeng, & Chen, 2018) focused on temperature shocks, managing
climate/environmental risks and responding to the Carbon Disclosure
Project (CDP) survey to examinemarket responses to firms' voluntary cli-
mate change information disclosure or their associations with the cost of
debt financing/equity capital, this paper examines the dissemination
effect of carbon‐related information via Twitter (iCarbon) on the COE.
This broader effect is unlike that of disclosure andhas its own capitalmar-
ket consequences (Bushee et al., 2010). Corporate disclosures also “often
reach only a portion of investors, which results in information asymmetry
among investors” (Blankespoor et al., 2014, p. 79). Second, the prior
research (Bushee et al., 2010; Li, Ramesh, & Shen, 2011) has paid partic-
ular attention to press releases, as an information intermediary, to exam-
ine the effect of dissemination on information asymmetry. The press,
however, is biased towards the coverage of highly visible firms and often
modifies the information released by firms by adding a discussion, provid-
ing opinions, and/or summarising the news (Blankespoor et al., 2014). In
contrast, tweets disseminated by firms are short and independent of
media adjustments, which make them most likely to be used for dissem-
inating purposes rather than for providing comprehensive information.
Finally, although previous studies (Bartov, Faurel, & Mohanram, 2017;
Chen, De, Hu, & Hwang, 2014; Jame, Johnston, Markov, & Wolfe,
2016) examine the effect of user‐granted information over social mediaon capital market activity, we focus more on firm granted information.
Prior work shows how firms' dissemination onTwitter improves market
liquidity (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Prokofieva, 2015) and attenuates neg-
ative market reaction to product recalls (Lee, Hutton, & Shu, 2015) and
acquisition announcements (Mazboudi & Khalil, 2017), to the best of
our knowledge, no study has examined the effect of theTwitter dissem-
ination of carbon‐specific information on the COE.
We employ a sample of 1,737 observations, representing 584
nonfinancial firms with Twitter accounts, listed on the NASDAQ stock
exchange for the period 2009–2015. We use the implied COE, which is
based on the average of four estimates, as a proxy for the COE, and the
number of tweets that relate to carbon information1 as a proxy for
iCarbon. Our findings show that the better dissemination of carbon infor-
mation reduces a firm's equity financing costs. We also examine the
effect of firms' environmental disclosure, using a scoring level, on the
association between iCarbon and the COE. Our results report no effect
of environmental reporting, whereas iCarbon is negatively related to the
COE. Consistently, we find similar results by examining the effect of envi-
ronmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. Overall, our findings
support the legitimacy theory and indicate that firms that voluntarily
disseminate more carbon‐related information have a lower COE. The
results are robust for the alternative specifications of the model.
The organisation of the paper is as follows: The literature and
hypothesis development are reviewed in Section 2. The data and
methodology are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the
results and discusses the key findings. Section 5 concludes.2 | LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
DEVELOPMENT
Organisations operate in a social, political, and economic context (Buhr,
1998) and have obligations to society in general that go beyond their
interests and legal responsibilities. As a part of the modern project of
justice and progress, organisations establish their legitimacy based on
society's perception of their contribution to the public good (Brunsson,
2006). The relationship between organisations and society, then, is
viewed as a “social contract” in which their continuing existence relies
upon adapting to the social norms, values, and expectations of organisa-
tions and their activities. Such a strategy is essential to obtain and pre-
serve social approval or a licence to operate (Schepers, 2010), that is,
legitimacy2 by changing the societal perceptions of social constituen-
cies (Buhr, 1998; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Oliver, 1996; Patten, 1992;
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“Organisations seek to establish congruence between the social values
associated with or implied by their activities and the norms of
acceptable behaviour in the larger social system of which they are a
part” (p. 122). Undoubtedly, “organisations that … lack acceptable
legitimated accounts of their activities … are more vulnerable to claims
that they are negligent, irrational or unnecessary” (Meyer & Rowan,
2004, p. 50, cited in Suchman, 1995, p. 575).
We use legitimacy theory (e.g., Adams, Hill, & Roberts, 1998;
Campbell, 2000; Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Garriga & Melé, 2004;
Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Suchman, 1995; Zhao, 2012) as a positive
theory that embraces a system‐oriented perspective, which is derived
from political economy theory3 (e.g., Deegan, 2014; Williams, 1999;
Woodward, Edwards, & Birkin, 2001), to explain why firms dissemi-
nate carbon‐related information via Twitter. Much of the prior
research drawing on legitimacy theory to explain or predict particular
managerial activities claims that environmental disclosures to commu-
nicate with society, on whom an organisation depends for its viability,
are necessary to gain legitimacy among stakeholders (Deegan, 2014;
Zeng, Xu, Yin, & Tam, 2012), improve stakeholders' perceptions of a
firm's environmental efforts (Cho & Patten, 2007; Plumlee, Brown,
Hayes, & Marshall, 2015), mitigate stock market risk (Bansal &
Clelland, 2004; Orlitzky & Benjamin, 2001; Salama, Anderson, & Toms,
2011), reduce the COE capital (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul,
Guedhami, Kwok, & Mishra, 2011), improve financial performance
(Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & Vasvari, 2011; Margolis & Walsh, 2003;
Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003), and lessen exposures to political
and public pressures (Cho, Freedman, & Patten, 2012).
Lindblom (1994) identifies four possible paths to legitimisation to
respond to such public pressure. The first path is to inform the
relevant public about actual changes in activities or intentions to
improve performance. The second path is to attempt to alter stake-
holders' perceptions of negative events without making any changes
to those actions. The third path is to distract attention away from
the threatening events by emphasising more positive actions that do
not necessarily have to be related. The fourth path is to attempt to
influence society's expectations with regard to performance.
It is also pertinent to note that legitimacy is “a multidimensional
concept” (Álvarez‐García, Maldonado‐Erazo, & del Río, 2018, p. 72),
which, according to Suchman (1995), is composed of three dimensions
that co‐exist inmost real‐world settings: pragmatic,moral, and cognitive
legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) emphasises the self‐
interested calculations of the particular interests of an organisation's
most immediate social actors, through exchange, influence, or disposi-
tion. Pragmatic legitimacy occurs when the legitimacy granter fulfils
his/her interests, achieving a value contribution, while acquiring specific
commitmentswith the legitimacy seeker (Díez‐de‐Castro, Peris‐Ortiz, &3According to Gray, Owen, and Dams (1996), stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory are
both derived from a broader theory that has been called political economy theory. The polit-
ical economy is “the social, political, and economic framework within which human life takes
place” (Gray et al., 1996, p. 47). The viewpoint included is that society, politics, and economics
are inseparable, and economic issues cannot be investigated without considerations of the
political, social, and institutional framework in which the economic activity takes place.Díez‐Martín, 2018). The second dimension of legitimacy is moral (ethi-
cal) legitimacy, which “becomes the decisive source of societal accep-
tance for corporations in an increasing number of situations” (Palazzo
& Scherer, 2006, p. 74). Stakeholder pressure reflects moral legitimacy
(Salmi, 2008), which rests on judgements aboutwhether a given activity
is the right thing to do to promote the social welfare of the actors that
surround the organisation, rather than on judgements about whether
the evaluated objective benefits a particular set of constituents
(Suchman, 1995). Therefore, “moral legitimacy should be achievable
by claiming to be ethical and acting accordingly” (Treviño, den
Nieuwenboer, Kreiner, & Bishop, 2014, p. 200). An organisation is eval-
uated as legitimate from amoral point of viewwhen audiences perceive
that it defends and pursues principles accepted and valued as socially
positive, which are considered more important than private interests
by such an organisation (Díez‐de‐Castro et al., 2018; Miranda, Cruz‐
Suarez, & Prado‐Román, 2018). Maintaining this legitimacy notion leads
to competitive advantages, such as enhanced reputation (Schepers,
2010), which emphasises the economic benefits to organisations of
being different (Bowen, 2014). Moral legitimacy is usually analysed by
evaluating the appropriateness or desirability of the outcomes
(consequential legitimacy), procedures (procedural legitimacy), struc-
tures (structural legitimacy), and leaders (personal legitimacy) used to
achieve the objectives. Unlike moral legitimacy, cognitive legitimacy is
established when the techniques and procedures used to achieve an
organisation's objectives are perceived to be adequate and accepted
without question (Iglesias‐Pérez, Blanco‐González, & Navalón, 2018;
Salmi, 2008). Cognitive legitimacy accentuates that an organisation is
granted legitimacy when audiences see its activities as fitting into their
beliefs and assumptions or when they cannot imagine that an organisa-
tion would not be corresponding to their interests (Treviño et al., 2014).
Cognitive legitimacy, therefore, represents a state of “comprehensibil-
ity” or a “taken‐for‐granted” (inevitability or permanence; Palazzo &
Scherer, 2006; Schepers, 2010) and operates at the subconscious level,
making it difficult for the organisation to directly and strategically
influence perceptions (Suchman, 1995).
Using legitimacy theory as an interpretive lens, Patten (1992)
examined the change in the environmental disclosures of annual
reports by 21 North American petroleum companies in response to
the increased environmental concern resulting from the 1989 Alaskan
Exxon Valdez oil spill incident. He argued that if the Alaskan oil spill
resulted in a threat to the legitimacy of petroleum firms and not just
to Exxon, then legitimacy theory would suggest that companies oper-
ating within the petroleum industry would respond by increasing envi-
ronmental disclosures in their annual reports. Patten's results show
that there was a significant increase in the environmental disclosures
made by the companies across the petroleum industry for the post‐
1989 period, even though the incident itself was directly related to
one petroleum company. Patten suggested that threats to a firm's
legitimacy entice it to include environmental information in its annual
report. Deegan and Rankin (1996) also utilised legitimacy theory to
explore how organisations altered their environmental reporting prac-
tices in their annual reports around the time of environmental prose-
cutions. The sample consisted of 20 Australian companies, which
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Victorian Environmental Protection Authorities, during the period
1990–1993. Of those firms that had been prosecuted, 18 provided
positive and qualitative environmental news in their annual reports.
Only two of the companies within the sample made any reference to
the prosecutions. They found that prosecuted firms disclosed more
environmental information (of a positive nature) in the annual report
in the year of prosecution than any other year in the sample period.
The prosecuted firms also disclosed more environmental information
relative to nonprosecuted firms. The results of the study supported
the view that management considered that the prosecutions
negatively impacted the community's perception of the organisation,
and as a result, management made other affirmative environmental
disclosures in the annual report to limit the likely damage to the
company's reputation as a result of the prosecutions.
More recently, Cho et al. (2012) examined two competing theories
(voluntary disclosure theory4 and legitimacy theory) to explain why
some firms choose to disclose their environmental capital spending,
whereas others do not. They found that disclosure does not appear
to signal better future environmental performance relative to nondis-
closure and that firms with worse environmental performance are
more likely to disclose the amount they spend. They concluded that
firms use environmental disclosure more as a strategic legitimising
resource for reducing their exposures to political and regulatory
concerns than as a mechanism for signalling superior environmental
performance. Stanny (2013) examined voluntary disclosures
concerning greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by U.S. S&P 500 firms
to the CDP from 2006 to 2008 and found that many firms only
answer the CDP questionnaire but do not disclose their emission
amounts or how they account for them. Consistent with legitimacy
theory's predictions, she concluded that firms disclose the minimum
necessary to reduce adverse public opinion, avoid scrutiny, and deter
the possibility of being targeted by a shareholder resolution.
This paper contributes to empirical tests of legitimacy by
examining a particular class of voluntary environmental information
(iCarbon) and its dissemination impact on the COE. Climate change
and its consequences present one of the most persistent threats to
global economic stability (Peng et al., 2015) and have the potential
to affect firms' costs of equity capital, which is the required rate of
return given the market's perception of a firm's riskiness (El Ghoul
et al., 2011). The current emergence of investor interest in climate‐
related risks calls for a specific type of global data about such risks
to support rational investment decisions (The Economist, 2017).
Managers have private information about firms' carbon profiles,
including the carbon strategy, carbon emissions, and carbon reduction
activities that is not directly accessible by outside stakeholders (Luo &
Tang, 2014). Organisations seek to protect (or enhance) past legiti-
macy accomplishments that they have already acquired by developing
“a defensive stockpile of supportive beliefs, attitudes and accounts”4Voluntary disclosure theory explains the disclosure of both general and financial environ-
mental information (Bewley & Li, 2000). Such theory suggests that companies use the infor-
mation “to signal an unobservable proactive strategy towards environmental concerns
relative to poorer performing firms” (Cho et al., 2012, p. 487).(Suchman, 1995, p. 595). Lee, Park and Klassen (2015) provided empir-
ical evidence to support this theoretical supposition. They examined a
sample of Korean firms from the CDP and concluded that firms could
mitigate the adverse effects of carbon disclosure on shareholder value
by communicating their carbon news periodically (i.e., carbon manage-
ment efforts and performance through the media coverage of global
warming in daily newspapers) in advance of its carbon disclosure. It
can thus be implied that managers strategically release relevant
information to maximise the value of the firm as perceived by capital
providers (see Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010).
Accordingly, iCarbon can be considered a legitimate social contribu-
tion made by firms to enhance organisational credibility and legitimacy
(see S. Y. Lee et al., 2015) and can be among the various aspects of trans-
parency in environmental reporting to change societal perceptions and
to respond to climate change‐related political and public pressures.
iCarbon is also expected to reduce investors' incentive to acquire private
information by improving the broadness of information to a wider reach
of investors, reducing information asymmetry, increasing share
demand, and thus reducing the COE (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Easley
&O'hara, 2004). Correspondingly, using iCarbon enables a firm to trans-
mit carbon‐related information at lower acquisition costs, allowing
potential investors to gain knowledge about a firm's environmental
information and assess carbon‐related risks. Such a strategy increases
the willingness among those investors to take on a larger portion of a
firm's shares,which improves risk diversification (risk sharing) and hence
reduces the COE (Heinkel et al., 2001; Merton, 1987).
Legitimacy, then, is a perception resource that organisations
manipulate through various communication‐related strategies (Aerts
& Cormier, 2009; Deegan, 2014; Higgins & larrinaga, 2014) to engage
in dialogues with stakeholders, to portray an image that these organi-
sations are trying to convey to the relevant public (Stanny, 2013), and
to enhance their reputation (Auger, Devinney, Dowling, Eckert, & Lin,
2013; Beyer et al., 2010; Busch & Hoffmann, 2011; De Villiers & Van
Staden, 2006; Hasseldine, Salama, & Toms, 2005; Ullmann, 1985). As
an innovative source of information, iCarbon serves as one of the com-
munication channels between a firm and its stakeholders. Legitimacy
theory suggests that the need to legitimise business actions will moti-
vate managers to voluntarily disseminate carbon‐related information
on Twitter. The discussion above leads to the following hypothesis:H1 The dissemination of carbon‐related information on
Twitter (iCarbon) has a significant and negative associa-
tion with the cost of equity (COE).3 | RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 | Sample and data
Our sample comprises all nonfinancial firms with official Twitter
accounts that are listed on the U.S. NASDAQ stock exchange for the
period from 2009 to 2015. We focus on U.S. firms because foreign
firms are exposed to different transparency levels, which influence
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permits firms to use social media, especially an interactive platform
such as Twitter, for disclosing corporate announcements. Many U.S.
firms also adopt Twitter and use it for multiple purposes, including
corporate announcements (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Jung, Naughton,
et al., 2018), which induces an expected coverage during the sample
period. We also focus on a single stock exchange to avoid any effect
from exchange listing (Bushee et al., 2010). Furthermore, our sample
period allows us to mitigate any macroeconomic effects of the
financial crisis.
Our data collection starts by identifying whether each firm in the
sample has an official Twitter account. We first search firms' websites,
including the Investor Relations pages, for any links or mentions of a
firm's Twitter account. If a firm has not provided any Twitter account
on its websites, we identify all profiles that match their names onTwit-
ter by using the users' search engine. We ensure that only certified
accounts, with a blue verified Twitter badge, are considered, assuring
that the firms are the main source of carbon‐related information. We
also use Google's search engine to search for firms' adoption and pres-
ence on Twitter.
To measure the implied COE, we require all firms in our sample to
have positive median earnings forecasts for 1 and 2 years ahead.
These earnings forecasts are collected in June of each year to ensure
that analysts have assimilated all the information from the fiscal year
report in their forecasts. We also require firms to have available
COE estimates. This procedure retains a full sample of 1,737 observa-
tions, representing 584 firms.
To download a firm's tweets, we use twomain features that are usu-
ally used to aggregate Twitter data. We first use Twitter's application
programming interface, which provides up to 3,200 tweets per user. If
the number of tweets that the firm posts on Twitter exceeds 3,200,
we then use keyword searches usingTwitter's advanced search option.
This procedure makes it easier to manually retrieve tweets. We refine
our search criteria by using keywords that relate to carbon information
(e.g., carbon, climate change, CO2, emissions, GHG, global warming,
GHG, and pollution). We then merge all firms' tweets from theTwitter
application programming interface and advance search under one file.
We use two sources (Bloomberg and DataStream) to collect the
data used to estimate the dependent and control variables. We also
use LexisNexis to count the number of articles that are disseminated
on other communication channels and that are related to carbon infor-
mation. We allocate these articles by using company identifiers and
keyword search features. We use our carbon keyword list, mentioned
in Section 3.2.2, to retrieve carbon‐related news articles. This proce-
dure allows us to retrieve articles from many sources, such as The Wall
Street Journal, USA Today, The Washington Post, and The New York
Times. We also Winsorise the amount of carbon news coverage
(CD_NEWS), financial leverage (LEV), long‐term growth forecast
(LTG), beta coefficient (BETA), book‐to‐market ratio (BTM), earnings
surplus (SURP), and the dispersion of analysts' forecasts (DISP) at the
2.5th to 97.5th percentiles to control for outliers. This Winsorising
level is also used for the COE to eliminate negative values because
we are not expecting investors to require a negative rate of return.3.2 | Variables
3.2.1 | Cost of equity
Our dependent variable (COE) is based on the implied COE (El Ghoul
et al., 2011; Hail & Leuz, 2006), which is measured as the average of
four COE estimates: (a) Claus and Thomas' model (Claus & Thomas,
2001), RCT; (b) Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan's model (Gebhardt,
Lee, & Swaminathan, 2001), RGLS; (c) Ohlson and Juettner‐Nauroth's
model (Ohlson & Juettner‐Nauroth, 2005), ROJ; and (iv) Easton's model
(Easton, 2004), RMPEG. We use the average of these estimates to
reduce any estimation error of the COE (Hail & Leuz, 2006). We also
use this measure because it enables us to differentiate between the
influence of both cash flow and growth from the COE (Chen, Chen,
& Wei, 2009). This estimate is useful for time‐series variations in the
COE (Pástor, Sinha, & Swaminathan, 2008).3.2.2 | iCarbon
Our independent variable, iCarbon, reflects the number of carbon‐
related tweets that are disseminated to the public. We compute this
measure by searching for keywords and phrases that relate to
carbon‐related information. In this regard, we use many keywords that
were used in the prior literature and that align with carbon disclosure,
reporting and information (e.g., Griffin & Sun, 2013; Hahn, Reimsbach,
& Schiemann, 2015; Hsu & Wang, 2013; Lee, Park, & Klassen, 2015;
Schmidt, Ivanova, & Schäfer, 2013). We also use the Twitter hashtag
key (#), a feature that can be used to broaden climate information
and trigger discussions among users about an event or specific topic.
Thus, we include many hashtags that relate to carbon emissions,
climate change, and global warnings. In general, we define several
keyword lists based on combinations of words and single phrases to
identify iCarbon tweets.
To allocate iCarbon tweets, we process all collected tweets through
a matching scheme programme that we developed in Python. This pro-
gramme follows many steps: We ask the programme to (a) read all
firms' tweets, (b) divide these tweets into words, (c) remove the words
that have no meanings (“stop words” such as “a” and “the”), and (d)
align these tweets with our keyword lists, which we define as follows:
(“carbon*”, “emission*”, “gas”, “climate”, “GHG”, “pollution”, “CO2”)
AND (“disclos*”, “report*”, “statement*” “release*”, “announce”,
“declare*”).
(“carbon* emission*”, “gas emission*”, “climate emission*”, “GHG
emission*”, “pollution emission*”, “CO2 emission*”).
(“greenhouse gas”, “carbon dioxide”, “carbon neutral”, “carbon foot-
print”, “climate change”, “greenhouse effect*”, “carbon offset*”, “carbon
monoxide”, “@CDP”, “global warming*”,“fossil fuel*”, “#globalwarming”,
“#global_warming”, “#global‐warming”, “#climate‐change”,
“#climatechange”,”#climate_change”, “#climate”, “#carbonemission”).
After matching firms' tweets with our keyword lists, we count the
annual number of tweets that match our keyword lists for each firm or
zero otherwise. Appendix A provides some examples of iCarbon
tweets.
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Our control variables include many variables associated with firm char-
acteristics such as firm size (SIZE), BTM, and LEV (Botosan, 1997; Fama&
French, 1992; Hail & Leuz, 2006). Larger firms have a better information
environment and thus a lower COE (Gebhardt et al., 2001). The COE
increases for undervalued firms that have a greater BTM ratio. Addition-
ally, firms that have high LEV in their capital structure expect to have a
higher COE (Cao, Myers, Myers, & Omer, 2015). We also expect a pos-
itive association with the DISP, BETA, and LTG. Firms that have a more
uncertain information environment, systematic risk or market
mispricing would be expected to have a higher COE (Botosan, Plumlee,
& Wen, 2011; Cao et al., 2015; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Gebhardt et al.,
2001; Gode &Mohanram, 2003). We further control for the availability
of information by other intermediaries by including the amount of
CD_NEWS and the percentage of institutional holdings (INSTOWN;
Cao et al., 2015; Zhou et al., 2018). We expect higher carbon coverage
(CD_NEWS) and institutional ownership (INSTOWN) to improve a firm's
information environment and thus be associatedwith a lower COE (Cao
et al., 2015; Griffin & Sun, 2013; Li et al., 2017). We also consider the
content of firm news by controlling for SURP. Due to the higher uncer-
tainty of future earnings profitability, we expect that firmswith negative
earnings (LOSS) are difficult to analyse and thus have a higher COE
(Orens, Aerts, & Cormier, 2010). Furthermore, we include many vari-
ables that determine climate change/carbon information. Additionally,
we control for independent directors (BOD_IND), the environmental
committee (ENV_COMMITTEE), CDP participation (CDP), firm age
(AGE), and whether the firm is subject to the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA)Mandatory ReportingRule. Independent board directors
play a monitoring role in managerial decisions and activities, which
enhances disclosure policy and transparency. An environmental com-
mittee plays an advisory role in the better management of emissions
and disclosure policy and amotivating role in reporting reliable informa-
tion. We also include the CDP to control for firms' willingness to report
carbon information. This measure represents the firm's ability to iden-
tify carbon‐related issues and their potential consequences (Jung,
Herbohn, & Clarkson, 2018). Aged firms “tend not to choose to operate
environmental information disclosure” (Zeng et al., 2012, p. 317). Firms
in industries that are more sensitive to carbon information are more
inclined to choose greater transparency in the policy of disclosure to
avoid the scrutiny of regulators (Deegan & Gordon, 1996). Therefore,
we expect firms under EPA regulation to respond more to investor
demand and to use iCarbon more. Technology firms are expected to
be more inclined towards technology adoption, and thus, we expect
them to be more active on Twitter (Blankespoor et al., 2014). The full
definition and measurement of our dependent, independent, and con-
trol variables are presented in Appendixes B and C.5Our results show the existence of a heteroscedasticity problem; the Breusch–Pagan test is
significant with p value = 0.000.
6The partial R2 is equal to 0.844, with an F statistic higher than the critical value (Staiger &
Stock, 1997). The Durbin Wu–Hausman test shows a p value of 0.87, suggesting that
endogeneity is not an issue. The Sargan test for overidentification is insignificant with a p
value equal to 0.4736.3.3 | Model
To examine the impact of iCarbon on COE, we employ the following
Model 1:COEit ¼ β0 þ β1 iCarbonit þ β2 SIZEit þ β3BTMit þ β4LEV þ β5DISPit
þ β6 BETAit þ β7 LTGit þ β8 Carbon¯NEWSit þ β9 INSTOWNit
þ β10 SURPit þ β11 LOSSit þ β12 BOD¯INDit
þ β13 ENV¯COMMITTEEit þþβ14 CDPit þ β15 AGEit
þ β16 EPAit þ β17 TECH¯FIRMit þ β18∑2009t¼2015Tt þ εit (1)
Our estimation procedures employ pooled Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regressions with robust standard error clustered at the firm level
to control for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (Cao et al., 2015;
El Ghoul et al., 2011; Ferris, Javakhadze, & Rajkovic, 2017; Petersen,
2009).5 We also utilise a two‐stage least squares (2SLS) model as an
alternative estimation, clustered at the firm level, to control for any
potential endogeneity between iCarbon and the COE (Nikolaev & Van
Lent, 2005). In this model, we use both the lagged value of iCarbon
and the industry‐year iCarbonmean as our instrumental variables. These
instruments are more related to a firm's engagement in iCarbon but
do not necessarily affect the firm's value or COE (Cheng, Ioannou, &
Serafeim, 2014; Schreck, 2011). Firms' performance environmental
and social issues are influenced by other firms' performance in the same
year, country and industry, whereas iCarbon in the prior year is expected
to reflect firms' persistence and the stability of using iCarbon over
time. To capture the validity of these instruments, our tests show that
both LAG_iCarbon and IND_iCarbon are significantly correlated with
iCarbon. We perform two diagnostic tests to identify the validity of both
the IVs and the specification of our system equations, the Sargan test
(misspecification test with the null hypothesis of no misspecification)
and the Breusch and Pagan LM test (to examinewhether cross‐equation
disturbances are truly associated with each other and if the equations
need to be tested simultaneously).6 Both IVs theoretically and statisti-
cally satisfy the necessary conditions for validity and relevance,
and hence, the 2SLS results tend to be consistent and more efficient
than those obtained using the OLS method.4 | RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1 | Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics, provided in Appendix D, for all our variables
in Model 1 show that the mean of COE is equal to 5.2%, which is con-
sistent with the prior literature (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Ferris et al.,
2017). The mean value of iCarbon is 0.51, which indicates that firms'
use of iCarbon is not high. The natural logarithm of firm size (SIZE)
has a mean equal to 21.147, which is equivalent to an unreported
mean of firm value equal to 9,144.414 million dollars. The mean and
median values of BTM are equal to 0.424 and 0.347, respectively.
On average, firms in our sample have leverage equivalent to 15%.
TABLE 1 The impact of iCarbon on cost of equity
Independent
variables
Dependent variables
(1) COE (2) COE
(OLS) (2SLS)
iCarbon −0.0003** (0.0001) −0.0003** (0.0001)
SIZE −0.0028*** (0.0011) −0.0028*** (0.0011)
BTM 0.0395*** (0.0047) 0.0401*** (0.0052)
LEV 0.0253*** (0.0064) 0.0204*** (0.0065)
DISP 0.014 (0.0107) 0.0156 (0.0113)
BETA 0.0062*** (0.002) 0.0054*** (0.0021)
LTG 0.0572*** (0.0175) 0.05*** (0.0176)
CD_NEWS 0.0024 (0.0015) 0.003* (0.0016)
INSTOWN −0.0115* (0.0059) −0.0082 (0.0061)
SURP −0.0003 (0.0002) −0.0002 (0.0002)
LOSS 0.0028 (0.0037) 0.0025 (0.0039)
INDEPENT 0.0132 (0.0115) 0.0116 (0.0124)
ENV_COMMITEE −0.0033 (0.0078) −0.0049 (0.008)
CDP 0.0044 (0.0028) 0.0054* (0.0029)
AGE 0.00001 (0.00006) 0.00001 (0.00006)
EPA 0.001 (0.0024) 0.0009 (0.0025)
TECH_FIRM −0.0127*** (0.0024) −0.0111*** (0.0025)
Year effect Yes Yes
Firm effect Yes Yes
Constant 0.0722*** (0.0244) 0.0822*** (0.0250)
Observations 936 839
R2 0.372 0.369
Note. COE: cost of equation; CD_NEWS: carbon news coverage; BTM:
book‐to‐market ratio; LEV: financial leverage; ISTOWN: institutional own-
ership; DISP: dispersion of analysts’ forecasts; BETA: beta coefficient; LTG:
long‐term growth forecast; ENV_COMMITEE: environmental committee;
CDP: Carbon Disclosure Project; TECH_FIRM: technology firms; EPA:
Environmental Protection Agency's. Table 1 presents the results of the
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Regarding news coverage of carbon information, on average, a
natural logarithm of 0.77 news articles is issued regarding firms. Fur-
thermore, the table shows that institutional investors own a high pro-
portion in terms of the mean and median of the sample. It also appears
that the mean of earnings surprise is negative (−0.334), whereas the
median is positive (0.031). Accordingly, approximately 18% of our
sample report negative earnings. Our sample also shows that 78% of
firms' board directors are independent and that a small number of
firms have an environmental committee and participate in the CDP,
with a mean value of 0.014 and 0.22, respectively. The mean (median)
of firm age (AGE) is 21.33 (18) years.
The Spearman and Pearson correlation matrix between the depen-
dent, independent, and control variables at the 10% significance level
are presented in Appendix E. The correlation matrix shows a negative
correlation between the COE and iCarbon. This finding provides initial
evidence that higher iCarbon use reduces the COE, which is consistent
with our hypothesis. Larger firms tend to have a lower COE. The
results also show that higher BTM, LEV, DISP, BETA, and LTG increase
the COE, whereas INSTOWN, SURP, and BOD_IND reduce the COE.
Additionally, our results show that loss‐making firms have higher
equity financing. In short, these results are consistent with the view
that the COE is lower for firms with less uncertainty and a richer infor-
mation environment. Consistently, participation in the CDP reduces
the COE. However, the positive association between iCarbon and SIZE
indicates that larger firms use iCarbon more, which is consistent with
prior findings (Lee, 2012; Weinhofer & Hoffmann, 2010). Our results
show that iCarbon is positively correlated with DISP and CD_NEWS.
Firms that have negative earnings are less likely to use iCarbon.
Conversely, higher BOD_INDP leads to increased use of iCarbon.
Consistently, firms that participate in the CDP disseminate more
carbon‐related information on Twitter. Overall, the correlation matrix
and unreported variance inflation factor tests indicate that
multicollinearity is not an issue across our empirical models.
impact of iCarbon on COE. The sample comprises of nonfinancial NASDAQ
firms with Twitter accounts for a period from 2009 to 2015. See Appen-
dixes B and C for variables descriptions and measurements. Column (1)
presents the regression findings from pooled regression (OLS) clustered
at the firm level. Column (2) presents the regression findings from the sec-
ond stage of two stage least square (2SLS) model clustered at firm level. In
parentheses, robust standard errors are presented.
*10%. **5%. ***1%.4.2 | Empirical results
Table 1 reports the results of both the OLS and 2SLS estimation
models for testing our hypothesis, identifying the possible negative
significant impact of iCarbon on the COE. The results show significant
negative coefficients between iCarbon and the COE for both models
(p < 0.05) in Columns 1 and 2. These findings imply that a managerial
decision to disseminate carbon‐related information (iCarbon) on
Twitter reduces the COE. Such an improvement in information dissem-
ination allows many investors to receive information in a timely and
efficient manner, resulting in lower uncertainty in evaluating a firm's
future cash flows and a better assessment of a firm's risks. Therefore,
firms' decision to disseminate and broaden carbon information pro-
vides benefits for both firm management and investors. First, this dis-
semination and broadening allows managers to mitigate information
asymmetry and improve legitimacy and investor recognition. Second,this dissemination and broadening enables investors to acquire firm
information at a lower acquisition cost and estimate firms' potential
risks. Even though these tweets are short, providing less comprehen-
sive information, the dissemination role of carbon information on
Twitter, apart from disclosure, has a negative impact on the COE.
The findings also indicate a significant negative association for
SIZE and positive associations for BTM, LEV, BETA, and LTG. These
results suggest that the market perceives firms that are small in size
or have a high growth rate, financial leverage, or systematic risk to
be high‐risk firms and thus should offer a higher required rate of
return (COE). The negative coefficient of INSTOWN suggests that
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ment, which reduces uncertainty and thus also reduces the COE. Fur-
thermore, the nature of the industry may have a differing effect on the
COE (Fama & French, 1997). Our results show that technology firms
(TECH_FIRM) tend to have a lower COE. These firms face greater
demand for information, which motivates them to provide more infor-
mation through disclosure (Kothari, 2000). Previous studies have
found that firms that belong to this industry and use Twitter to dis-
seminate corporate information reduce information asymmetry and
improve market liquidity (Blankespoor et al., 2014), which, in turn,
reduces the COE. The regression models have R2 equal to 0.37, indi-
cating that our models explain 37% of the variance in the COE. This
result is consistent with the previous literature (e.g., Breuer, Müller,
Rosenbach, & Salzmann, 2018; Cao et al., 2015; El Ghoul et al.,
2011), although smaller R2 is not uncommon in the field of social sci-
ences (Wooldridge, 2015). Overall, the results indicate that iCarbon
helps to reduce equity financing. This finding may help managers to
consider using iCarbon strategically as part of their voluntary disclo-
sure policy to gain legitimacy among stakeholders. This evidence also
provides insight into the importance of social media, particularly
Twitter, as a communication channel to connect with various
investors. This mechanism is expected to reduce information
asymmetry, improve recognition, reduce acquisition costs, and
enhance investors' estimation of risk.7We use the Bloomberg database to obtain the ESG disclosure score, which reflects a firm's
social, environmental, and governance data that are available to the public from corporate
websites, press releases, annual reports, sustainability reports, and corporate governance
reports. The score covers many topics such as board structure and independence, human cap-
ital, shareholders' rights, and GHG emissions. Such information is reflected in the ESG index
score to reflect both the amount and importance of information. The score ranges from 0.1
to 100, where each data point is weighted in term of its importance and relevance to industry
peers.4.3 | Additional analyses
4.3.1 | The effect of Bloomberg's environmental
(ENV) and ESG disclosure
We further address whether a firm's level of environmental disclosure
would affect the association between iCarbon and the COE. Firms that
are more socially responsible have more incentives to disclose and
engage in environmental activities and practices (Harjoto & Jo,
2015). These firms are motivated to maintain and improve their public
images by generating positive media coverage, which, in turn,
improves firm value and decreases the COE (Cahan, Chen, Chen, &
Nguyen, 2015; Fatemi, Glaum, & Kaiser, 2018). That is, investor pref-
erence for environmentally friendly firms can lead to a lower investor
base that is willing to buy and hold shares in polluting firms. This pref-
erence reduces risk sharing and thus increases firms' equity financing,
creating environmental costs for firm managers (Chava, 2014; Heinkel
et al., 2001; Merton, 1987). Accordingly, poor environmental perfor-
mance induces lower demand by institutional investors and less “loan
syndicate” participation by banks (Chava, 2014; Hsu & Wang, 2013).
These studies show that firms should consider the benefits of environ-
mental information to reduce their equity financing. Accordingly, firms
with different levels of environmental performance induce different
behaviours towards using communication channels to respond to
environmental issues and concerns (de Villiers & Van Staden, 2011).
As such, firms with better environmental performance promote more
voluntary climate change disclosure (Dawkins & Fraas, 2011). We
therefore expect firms with a higher environmental disclosure scoreto use iCarbon. Hence, we address whether a firm's disclosure score
of environmental reporting would affect our main findings.
We use Bloomberg for firm environmental disclosure
(ENV_SCORE). This variable incorporates data from many sources,
including annual reports, the CDP, firms' websites, and CSR reports,
generating a comprehensive score for firm disclosure. This score is esti-
mated in terms of both industry relevance and data availability, starting
from 0.1 for low‐disclosing firms and continuing up to 100 for high‐
disclosing firms. The weighting system takes into account the impor-
tance of each category, making a category such as GHG emissions carry
greaterweight than other disclosure items.Weighting each data point in
terms of its importancemakes the disclosure score reflect both the qual-
ity and quantity of disclosure (Bernardi & Stark, 2018; Qiu, Shaukat, &
Tharyan, 2016). We address this issue by including the environmental
score (ENV_SCORE) and the interaction between iCarbon and the envi-
ronmental score (iCarbon * ESG_SCORE) in Model 2 as follows:
COEit ¼ β0 þ β1iCarbonit þ β2 ENV¯SCOREit þ β3 iCarbonit*ENVSCOREit
þ β4 SIZEit þ β5BTMit þ β6LEV þ β7DISPit þ β8 BETAit
þ β9 LTGit þ β10 CarbonNEWSit þ β11 INSTOWNit þ β12 SURPit
þ β13 LOSSit þ β14 BODINDit þ β15 ENVCOMMITTEEit þ β16 CDPit
þ β17 AGEit þ β18 EPAit þ β19 TECH¯FIRMit
þ β20∑2009t¼2015Tt þ εit (2)
We also examine a broader aspect of a firm's disclosure than simply
environmental reporting by taking into account two components of sus-
tainability reporting in addition to environmental disclosure: social and
governance disclosures. In this section, we address whether a firm's dis-
closure score of ESG disclosure would also influence the association
between iCarbon and the COE. The combination of all ESG dimensions
enables many investors to evaluate a firm's risks, opportunities, and
transparency, which in turn improves firm value and reduces the COE
(Ng & Rezaee, 2015; Yu, Guo, & Luu, 2018). Such an effect is more pro-
nounced for lower‐ESG‐disclosure‐performing firms than for higher‐
ESG‐disclosure‐performing firms (Crifo, Forget, & Teyssier, 2015).
However, firms with better ESG disclosure have better interaction and
communication with stakeholders (Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014).
These firms are likely to disclose their ESG activities and initiatives to
signal and differentiate themselves in the capital market from those
with lower ESG disclosure ratings (Crifo et al., 2015). We therefore
expect firms with better ESG disclosure scores to strategically use
iCarbonmore than those with lower ESG disclosure scores.7 Therefore,
we investigate whether the ESG disclosure score (ESG_SCORE) would
moderate the association between iCarbon and the COE. To examine
this influence, we include ESG_SCORE and its interaction with iCarbon
(iCarbon * ESG_SCORE) in Model 3:
TABLE 2 The effect of ENV and ESG score
Independent variables
Dependent variables
Model (2) Model (3)
COE COE
iCarbon −0.0005* (0.0003) −0.0013** (0.0006)
ENV_SCORE 0.00006 (0.0002)
iCarbon * ENV_SCORE 0.00002 (0.00002)
ESG_SCORE 0.0002 (0.0002)
iCarbon * ESG_SCORE 0.00003 (0.00002)
SIZE 0.0003 (0.0021) −0.0035*** (0.0011)
BTM 0.0448*** (0.012) 0.0385*** (0.0046)
LEV 0.0161 (0.0176) 0.0249*** (0.0064)
DISP 0.0195 (0.0164) 0.0145 (0.0107)
BETA 0.0032 (0.0047) 0.0065*** (0.002)
LTG 0.0291 (0.0368) 0.0594*** (0.0176)
CD_NEWS −0.0033* (0.0018) 0.0019 (0.0015)
INSTOWN 0.0073 (0.0124) −0.0096 (0.0059)
SURP 0.0003 (0.0033) −0.0003 (0.0002)
LOSS −0.0052 (0.0077) 0.0031 (0.0037)
INDEPENT 0.0101 (0.0193) 0.0107 (0.0123)
ENV_COMMITEE −0.0026 (0.0082)
CDP 0.0005 (0.0057) 0.0028 (0.0028)
AGE 0.000006 (0.0001) 0.00001 (0.00006)
EPA 0.0009 (0.0045) 0.0005 (0.0024)
TECH_FIRM −0.0124*** (0.0044) −0.0128*** (0.0024)
Year effect Yes Yes
Firm effect Yes Yes
Constant 0.0229 (0.0568) 0.0875*** (0.0261)
Observations 212 927
R2 0.335 0.377
Note. ENV_COMMITEE: environmental committee; ESG: environmental,
social, and governance; COE: cost of equation; CD_NEWS: carbon news
coverage; BTM: book‐to‐market ratio; LEV: financial leverage; DISP: dis-
persion of analysts' forecasts; BETA: beta coefficient; LTG: long‐term
growth forecast; CDP: Carbon Disclosure Project; SURP: earnings surplus;
ISTOWN: institutional ownership; TECH_FIRM: technology firms; EPA:
Environmental Protection Agency's. Table 2 presents the effects of envi-
ronmental and ESG reporting on the association between iCarbon and
COE. The sample comprises of nonfinancial NASDAQ firms with Twitter
accounts for a period for a period from 2009 to 2015.See Appendixes B
and C for variables descriptions and measurements. Model (2) presents
the results after adding environmental reporting (ENV) score and its inter-
action with iCarbon. Model (3) includes environmental, social, and gover-
nance (ESG) score and its interaction with iCarbon. The coefficient
estimates are results from pooled regression (OLS) clustered at the firm
level. In parentheses, robust standard errors are presented.
*10%. **5%. ***1%.
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þ β3 iCarbonit*ESGSCORE þ β4 SIZEit þ β5BTMit þ β6LEV
þ β7DISPit þ β8 BETAit þ β9 LTGit þ β10 CarbonNEWSit
þ β11 INSTOWNit þ β12 SURPit þ β13 LOSSit þ β14 BODINDit
þ β15 ENVCOMMITTEEit þ β16 CDPit þ β17 AGEit þ β18 EPAit
þ β19 TECH¯FIRMit þ β20∑2009t¼2015Tt þ εit (3)
We employ OLS regression with a robust standard error cluster at the
firm level to estimate both Models 2 and 3 and present the results in
Table 2. In these models, we have centralised our explanatory variables
(i.e., iCarbon, ENV_SCORE, and ESG_SCORE) and their interactions
(i.e., iCarbon*ENV_SCORE and iCarbon*ESG_SCORE). The finding
from Model 2 shows that ENV_SCORE does not affect the association
between iCarbon and the COE, as the interaction between iCarbon and
ENV_SCORE has no significant coefficient with the COE. This result
means that the number of iCarbon tweets has a direct association with
the COE, which is not affected by the environmental disclosure score.
The result from Model 3 shows a similar finding of a negative associa-
tion for iCarbon on the COE, which is consistent with our main find-
ings. The results also show no significant association for the
interaction iCarbon*ESG_SCORE.
Similarly, we found no significant association between ESG disclo-
sure and the COE. Overall, the findings provide evidence that the
association between iCarbon and the COE is not affected by either
ENV_SCORE or ESG_SCORE. The results support our argument that
investors appreciate carbon messages and dissemination, which is dif-
ferent from the reporting score.
4.3.2 | Robustness checks
As a robustness check, we use different measures for the COE and
iCarbon and add different sets of control variables to our main Model
1. The results are reported in Table 3. We use RPEG (Easton, 2004) as
an alternative measure of the COE. RPEG is considered a reliable
measure for the COE and is widely used in the literature (Mangena,
Li, & Tauringana, 2016). This measure assumes no dividend payout
and is associated “with firm‐specific risk characteristics in a theoreti-
cally predictable and stable manner” (Botosan et al., 2011, p. 1085).
We employ the analysis in our main Model 1 by alternatively using
RPEG instead of the COE in Column 1. The results show consistent
evidence that iCarbon is negatively associated with the COE, as
measured by RPEG.
We also use two alternative measures of iCarbon. First, we use the
number of iCarbon tweets that have a hyperlink. Including a hyperlink
allows users to acquire more information by following the link
(Blankespoor et al., 2014). Second, we use the number of iCarbon
tweets that have been retweeted. This measure enhances the size of
the audience as users share a firm's iCarbon tweets with their fol-
lowers through the retweet button (Jung, Naughton, et al., 2018).
Cade (2018) claim that retweeted messages are considered more valid
by investors. We present the results in Columns 2 and 3 in Table 3.
The results indicate that tweets with a hyperlink to the full informa-
tion of a press release or news articles (iCarbon_Hyperlink) that are dif-
fused to a larger number of users (iCarbon_Retweet) on Twitter arenegatively associated with the COE. This finding is consistent with
our main findings.
In Column 4, we control for multiple variables used in the prior lit-
erature (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Harjoto & Jo, 2015; Jung, Naughton,
TABLE 3 Robustness tests for other measurements and additional variables
Independent
variables
Dependent variables
Alternative measure of COE
Alternative measure of iCarbon Additional control variables GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RPEG2–1 COE COE COE COE
iCarbon −0.0004** (0.0002) −0.0003* (0.0002) −0.0017* (0.001)
iCarbon_Http −0.0005** (0.0002)
iCarbon_Retweet −0.0004** (0.0002)
SIZE −0.0135*** (0.0017) −0.0034** (0.0014) −0.0034** (0.0014) −0.0015 (0.0013) .004 (0.0061)
BTM 0.008 (0.009) 0.0407*** (0.0061) 0.0406*** (0.0061) 0.0501*** (0.0064) 0.0501*** (0.019)
LEV −0.0007 (0.011) 0.0226** (0.0089) 0.0225** (0.0089) 0.0286*** (0.0087) 0.0117 (0.0176)
DISP 0.0736*** (0.0129) 0.0214 (0.0132) 0.0218 (0.0133) −0.0004 (0.0136) 0.0006 (0.0238)
BETA 0.0166*** (0.0042) 0.0059** (0.0026) 0.0059** (0.0026) 0.0048* (0.0025) −0.0073 (0.0091)
LTG −0.0876*** (0.0168) 0.0495** (0.0207) 0.0495** (0.0207) 0.0684*** (0.0158) 0.0720*** (0.0227)
CD_NEWS 0.0052** (0.0024) 0.0043** (0.0019) 0.0041** (0.002) −0.0002 (0.0016) 0.0036 (0.0026)
INSTOWN −0.0610*** (0.0128) −0.0170** (0.0077) −0.0170** (0.0078) −0.0108 (0.0081) −0.0085 (0.0113)
SURP −0.0004 (0.0005) −0.0002 (0.0003) −0.0002 (0.0003) −3.35e‐06 (0.0003) −0.0002 (0.0003)
LOSS 0.0554*** (0.0061) 0.0068 (0.0046) 0.0068 (0.0046) −0.0036 (0.0046) 0.0007 (0.0058)
INDEPENT 0.0232 (0.0185) 0.0104 (0.0145) 0.0100 (0.0145) 0.0277* (0.0156) 0.0010 (0.0152)
ENV_COMMITEE −0.023** (0.0089) −0.0031 (0.011) −0.0031 (0.0108) −0.0011 (0.0121) 0.0105 (0.0098)
CDP 0.0051 (0.0048) 0.0038 (0.0036) 0.0037 (0.0036) 0.0038 (0.0038) −0.0065 (0.0075)
AGE −0.0003*** (0.00008) −0.00004 (0.0001) −0.00003 (0.0001) 0.00005 (0.00006) −0.0001 (0.0003)
EPA 0.0062 (0.0047) 0.0008 (0.0033) 0.0008 (0.0033) 0.0066* (0.0034) 0.0008 (0.0032)
TECH_FIRM −0.0053 (0.0044) −0.0144*** (0.0031) −0.0143*** (0.0031) −0.0116*** (0.0036) −0.0081 (0.0052)
DUM_CEO −0.0026 (0.0028)
GROWTH_SALES −0.0042 (0.0082)
R&D 0.0017 (0.0277)
CAPX −0.0613* (0.0351)
ADVERTISING −0.0054*** (0.0017)
LITI 0.0032 (0.0031)
COEt‐1 0.410*** (0.137)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Constant 0.409*** (0.0423) 0.0915*** (0.0307) 0.0916*** (0.0310) 0.0218 (0.0318) −0.0686 (0.127)
Observations 1,873 561 561 480 461
R2 0.419 0.414 0.413 0.456
Note. ENV_COMMITEE: environmental committee; ESG: environmental, social, and governance; COE: cost of equation; CD_NEWS: carbon news coverage;
BTM: book‐to‐market ratio; LEV: financial leverage; DISP: dispersion of analysts' forecasts; BETA: beta coefficient; LTG: long‐term growth forecast; CDP:
Carbon Disclosure Project; SURP: earnings surplus; ISTOWN: institutional ownership; R&D: Research and development; TECH_FIRM: technology firms;
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency's; GMM: generalised method of moments. Table 3 presents the regression findings from our main Model (1) using
alternative measures of COE, iCarbon, including additional control variables and using alternative estimation model. The sample comprises of nonfinancial
NASDAQ firms withTwitter accounts for a period from 2009 to 2015. See Appendixes B and C for variables descriptions and measurements. In Column (1)
we use RPEG on Model (1) instead of COE. Alternative: we use iCarbon with hyperlink in Column (2) and iCarbon tweets that are retweeted in Column (3)
instead of iCarbon in Model (1). Column (4) reports the regression after adding many control variables (ADVERTISING, CEOAGE, SALES_GROWTH, LITI, R&D,
and CAPX). Column (5) estimate Model (1) by using GMM regression technique and including lagged value of COE (COEt‐1). The coefficient estimates are
results from pooled regression (OLS) clustered at the firm level except for Column (5). In parentheses, robust standard errors are presented.
*10%. **5%. ***1%.
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ALBARRAK ET AL. 1189et al., 2018; Lee, Hutton, & Shu, 2015). We control for the ratio of
advertising expenses to total assets (ADVERTISING) and a dummy
variable for whether a firm's CEO is younger than the average
(CEOAGE) and the percentage change in sales growth
(SALES_GRWOTH). Firms that spend more on advertisements and
have younger CEOs and high growth rates in sales are expected to
adopt social media, have Twitter accounts, and disclose more
announcements on communication channels (Jung, Naughton, et al.,
2018; Lee, Hutton, & Shu, 2015). We also expect a firm's valuation
to increase by generating high sales growth. Additionally, some indus-
tries are subject to different litigation risks and more potential law-
suits. Hence, we include dummy variables (LITI) for firms that
operate in high‐litigation industries (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). We also
control for research and development (R&D) and capital expenditure
(CAPX). Although R&D is an expense that a firm pays, this expense
might generate value (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Furthermore, firms
with high growth in sales (SALES_GROWTH, R&D and CAPX) are
expected to disclose more environmental information (Dhaliwal
et al., 2011; Harjoto & Jo, 2015). The results show negative associa-
tions for ADVERTISING and CAPX with the COE. In contrast,
DUM_CEO, GROWTH_SALES, R&D, and LITI have no association
with the COE. These findings mitigate any concern towards a firm's
willingness to adopt Twitter and disclose carbon information.
Finally, we further reestimate our regression model by using the
generalised method of moments (GMM).8 We use the GMM model
to address the endogeneity problem that may affect the interpretation
of our association between iCarbon and the COE. Our results in
Column 5 show that iCarbon is significant and negatively associated
with the COE. This finding is consistent with our main finding. The
results for the GMM estimation model show that first‐order serial cor-
relation (AR(1)) is significant (p = 0.031), rejecting the null hypothesis
of correlated differences in the residual, whereas the second‐order
serial correlation (AR(2)) is insignificant (p = 0.391), indicating no corre-
lation difference in the residual. The results also show that the result
of the Hansen test (p = 0.231) is insignificant, which validates our
instruments to address the overidentification problem.5 | CONCLUSION
This study examined whether a firm's voluntary dissemination of
carbon‐related information on Twitter influences the COE. Using a
sample of nonfinancial firms with Twitter accounts that were listed
on NASDAQ throughout the period 2009–2015, we developed a mea-
sure of carbon information reported via Twitter to reflect the number
of firms that decide to disseminate carbon‐related information in this
way and broaden their reach to investors. The results show that firms
disseminating carbon‐related information tend to have a lower COE.
This association holds consistently throughout alternative estimations
and is not affected by either environmental or ESG disclosure. Overall,
our results suggest that the increase in a firm's dissemination of8This regression model addresses the endogeneity and unobservable variable effects by using
a lagged value as an instrumental variable.carbon information improves investor recognition among many poten-
tial investors and environmentally concerned groups, reduces informa-
tion asymmetry between market participants, and enables investors to
evaluate firms' potential risk and acquire firm information at lower
acquisition costs, which in turn reduces the COE.
This paper provides several implications for market participants,
managers, and policymakers about integrating information technology
into their strategic voluntary disclosure policy. Our results show the
importance of firm managers considering the dissemination of
carbon‐related information seriously and the benefit to the COE. As
Twitter allows market participants to receive firm information in a
timely and efficient manner, iCarbon enables many market participants
to assess a firm's potential risk and make better investment decisions.
Additionally, firms should consider using iCarbon to address investors'
concerns and information demands. Our findings suggest that market
participants incorporate carbon information, in addition to disclosure,
that is disseminated on Twitter. This evidence prepares regulators to
take steps towards encouraging firms to disseminate carbon informa-
tion and providing more guidance on carbon emissions. Although firms
are mandated to report their emissions under EPA regulations, further
regulations under the Clean Power Plan are under review, and they
are expected to be dismantled by President Trump, who led the
United States's exit from the Paris Agreement on climate change
(Davenport & Rubin, 2018). The initial plan under Obama's administra-
tion aimed to reduce GHG emissions by 32% by 2030. The Trump
administration proposes an easier plan that would cut emissions by
approximately 0.7% to 1.5%. Our evidence suggests that market par-
ticipants have an interest in climate change reporting, which should
encourage regulators to implement a more solid plan for climate
change. Furthermore, these results show the importance of using
Twitter as a disclosure channel to communicate with market
participants, to attract potential investors, and to improve information
sharing. These benefits are expected to improve firms' information
environment and transparency and to reduce the COE.
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EXAMPLES OF iCarbon TWEETSAPPENDIX B
VARIABLES DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENTSVariable Definition Measurement Source
Dependent variables
COE
RPEG2–1
Implied cost of equity The average of four cost of equity estimates
(ROJ, RMPEG, RCT and RGLS)
Bloomberg
Easton (2004) Price Earnings
Growth Model
P*t ¼
FEPS2 − FEPS1
R2PEG
Pt = share price as of June next year
FEPS t = median forecast of earnings per share
Bloomberg
Independent variables
iCarbon Firm's carbon‐related Tweets The number of carbon‐related tweets or zero otherwise Twitter API and
Manual collection
(Continued)
Variable Definition Measurement Source
iCarbon_Hyperlink
iCarbon_Retweet
Firm's carbon‐related Tweets
with hyperlink
Firm's carbon‐related Tweets
that are retweeted
The number of carbon‐related tweets that contain
hyperlink or zero otherwise
The number of carbon‐related tweets that are
retweeted or zero otherwise
Twitter API and
Manual collection
Twitter API and
Manual collection
Control variables
SIZE
BTM
LEV
DISP
BETA
LTG
CD_NEWS
INSTOWN
SURP
LOSS
BOD_IND
ENV_COMMITTEE
CDP
AGE
EPA
TECH_FIRM
ENV_SCORE
ESG_SCORE
ADVERTISING
CEOAGE
SALES_GROWTH
LITI
CAPX
R&D
Firm size
Book value to market ratio
Financial leverage
Analysts' forecast dispersion
Firm beta
The consensus long term
growth forecast
News coverage
Institutional ownership
Earning surprise
Negative earnings
Board Independence
Environmental Committee
CDP participation
Firm age
EPA industry rules
Technology firms
Environmental reporting score
Environmental, social and
governance reporting score
Advertising intensity
CEO age
Sales growth
Litigation
Capital expenditure
Research and development
Natural logarithm of firm's equity market value
Book to market value ratio
Long‐term debt to equity market value ratio
Standard deviation of one‐year consensus EPS forecast
Beta coefficient of market model using 60 with at least
24 months stock and market return
The mean of long‐term growth rate of earnings
forecast or 2 minus 1 year ahead average EPS
forecast scaled by 1 year ahead average EPS forecast
Natural logarithm of number of carbon‐related news articles
The percentage of firm's shares owned by institutions
Consensus earnings forecast minus firm's earnings
scaled by share price
Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm
reports negative earnings and 0 otherwise
The percentage of independent directors in the board
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a
firm has an environmental committee
and 0 otherwise
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm participate
and report to CDP and 0 otherwise
The number of years since the firm is listed
Dummy variable that take a value of 1 if the firm belong to
industry under GHG Mandatory Reporting Regulation and 0
otherwise
Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm
belongs to technology industry (SIC 3570–3579,
3610–3699, 7370–7379, 3810–3849,
4800–4899, 4931, 4941) and 0 otherwise
Disclosure score of the amount of environmental
reports that available to the public
Disclosure score of the amount of environmental, social and
governance reports that available to the public
Total advertising expenses divided by total revenue
Dummy variable that takes 1 if CEO age is under the median value of
other CEO age and 0 otherwise
Sales change from previous year divided by total
sales of previous year
Dummy variable that take 1 if the firm belong to
high litigation industry (SIC 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 5200–5961,
3600–3674, 7370) and 0 otherwise
Total capital expenditure divided by total revenue
Research and development expenditure divided
by total assets
Bloomberg
Bloomberg
Bloomberg
Bloomberg
Bloomberg
Bloomberg
LexisNexis
Bloomberg
Bloomberg
Bloomberg
Bloomberg
Bloomberg
Bloomberg
CRSP
Manually
Manually
Bloomberg
Bloomberg
Bloomberg
DataStream
Bloomberg
Manually
Bloomberg
Bloomberg
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COST OF EQUITY MEASUREMENTSCOE estimates Formula
ROJ
Ohlson and Juettner‐Nauroth
(2005)
ROJN ¼ Aþ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
A2 þ Et EPStþ1ð Þ
P*t
 !
g2 − gltð Þ
vuut
A ¼ 0:5 glt þ
DPStþ1
P*t
 !
EPS t + 1 = The median forecast of EPS for June next year
DPS t + 1 = Dividend per share (DPS) for the next year or 6% of ROA
g2 equals to the growth rate of short‐term earnings (EPSt + 2/EPSt + 1–1) or long‐term consensus analysts' earnings
forecasted. This model requires both EPSt + 1 and EPSt + 2 to be positive. gltequals to 10‐year treasury bonds yield
minus 3%
RMPEG
Modified Easton (2004) cost of
equity model
Pt ¼ Et EPStþ1ð ÞRMPEG þ
Et EPStþ1ð ÞEt gst − RMPEG⨯ 1þ FDIVð Þ½ 
R2MPEG
Pt = share price as of June
FEPS = the median value of future earnings per share (EPS)
FDIV = dividend pay‐outs ratio
DPS
EPS
 
DPS = dividend per share
EPS = earnings per share
The model assumes FEPS to be positive and if FEPS is negative, we measure FDIV as 6% of ROA.
RCT
Claus and Thomas (2001)
P*t ¼ Bt þ ∑
5
i¼1
FEPStþi − RCT⨯Btþi−1½ 
1þ RCTð Þi
þ FEPStþ5 − RCT⨯Btþ4½ ⨯ 1þ gltð Þ
RCT − gltð Þ 1þ RCTð Þ5
The model measures EPS for the first 3 years by using analyst earnings forecast. The fourth and fifth earnings
forecasted years are measures by multiplying the previous year earnings forecast by long term earnings growth rate
(LTG). If the LTG rate is missing, short‐term growth rate of FEPSt‐2 and FEPSt‐2 is used. The model measure glt as
the difference between 10 years Treasury bonds and 3%. The model also assume clean surplus relation to measure
future book value (Bt + i − 1 = Bt + EPSt + 1 − DPSt + 1). Future dividend is measured by multiplying EPS by dividend
pay‐out ratio (DPSt + 1 = EPSt + 1 ⨯ FDIV).
RRGLS
Gebhardt et al. (2001)
P*t ¼ Bt þ ∑
T − 1
i¼1
FROEtþi − RGLS½ ⨯Btþi−1
1þ RGLSð Þi
þ FROEtþT − RGLS½ ⨯BtþT−1
1þ RGLSð ÞT−1RGLS
The model use analyst forecast to measures future return on equity (FROE) of the first 3 years. Afterward, FROE is
measured by using linter interpolation of 10 years historical industry specific ROE median. If industrial ROE is lower
the risk‐free rate, we use risk free rate to replace industry ROE (Liu, Nissim, & Thomas, 2002). Beyond the 12 year,
the model assumes industry ROE to remain constant. Clean surplus is used to measure future book values. Where:
Bt + i − 1 = Bt + EPSt + 1 − DPSt + 1
DPSt + 1 = EPSt + 1 ⨯ FDIV
COE The average of four cost of equity estimates (ROJ, RMPEG, RCT, and RGLS) risk free
Note. COE: cost of equity.
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR COE, iCarbon, AND CONTROL VARIABLESVariables N Mean Med Min Max SD
COE 1,737 0.052 0.045 0.001 0.172 0.035
iCarbon 1,737 0.509 0 0 111.000 3.522
SIZE 1,732 21.147 20.968 17.009 27.163 1.715
BTM 1,732 0.424 0.347 −0.006 1.755 0.314
LEV 1,736 0.146 0.082 0 0.770 0.172
DISP 1,588 0.131 0.081 0.017 0.926 0.157
BETA 1,600 1.055 1.029 −2.075 3.879 0.563
LTG 1,737 0.181 0.153 −1.162 0.847 0.134
CD_NEWS 1,737 0.770 0 0 3.367 1.061
INSTOWN 1,490 0.863 0.920 0.00 1.707 0.260
SURP 1,703 −0.334 0.031 −85.714 42.446 7.962
LOSS 1,737 0.176 0 0 1 0.381
INDEPENT 1,625 0.781 0.818 0.143 1 0.122
ENV_COMMITEE 1,400 0.014 0 0 1 0.119
CDP 1,737 0.223 0 0 1 0.417
AGE 1,737 21.33 18 0 78 16.66
EPA 1,737 0.324 0 0 1 0.468
TECH_FIRMS 1,737 0.482 0 0 1 0.500
Note. ENV_COMMITEE: environmental committee; COE: cost of equation; CD_NEWS: carbon news coverage; BTM: book‐to‐market ratio; LEV: financial
leverage; DISP: dispersion of analysts' forecasts; BETA: beta coefficient; LTG: long‐term growth forecast; CDP: Carbon Disclosure Project; SURP: earnings
surplus; ISTOWN: institutional ownership; TECH_FIRM: technology firms; EPA: Environmental Protection Agency's. Appendix D presents summary statis-
tics for COE, iCarbon and control variables for nonfinancial NASDAQ firms with Twitter accounts for a period from 2009 to 2015. See Appendixes B and C
for variables descriptions and measurements. This table shows variables' observations number (N), values of mean (Mean), median (Med), minimum (Min)
and maximum (Max) and standard deviation (SD). We use Winsorising percentiles level of 2.5th to 97.5th to control for outliers.
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